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Family Law: Whose Kids Are They, Anyway?:
Analyzing Troxel v. Granville and the Current State of
Oklahoma's Grandparent Visitation Statute
[The makers of the Constitution] conferred,as againstthe government,
the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men.
Justice Brandeis, Olmstead v. United Statest
-

Introduction
Suppose you're a parent. Your children mean the world to you; you would never
intentionally do anything to harm them. Every day you strive to make decisions
concerning your children that further their best interests. You have raised them in
a loving, stable environment. It is not always the easiest job, but nevertheless you
press on, making decisions as to which cartoons they should watch and which are
simply too violent. Should you raise your children to believe in Santa Claus or will
that fantasy inevitably lead to disappointment? Should you spank your children or
try to reason with them? Should you allow your child to associate with that "rough
crowd"?
Parents face these types of child-rearing dilemmas every day. The answers to
these questions will vary from parent to parent and person to person. However
difficult these decisions may be, you as a parent have the right to be the person
making them for your children. Imagine that you have been faced with an
exceptionally difficult decision, whether to discontinue your child's relationship with
his grandparents. You conclude that your child's best interests will be served by
severing that relationship. Perhaps you have made this decision because the
grandparents practice a different religion, or because they have harmed you in some
way and you fear they will bring the same harm to your child. Now imagine that
the grandparents petition a court to intercede. After enduring substantial family
turmoil, spending a significant amount of time in court, and spending a significant
amount of money on an attorney, the court orders you to allow the grandparents to
see your child because, in the judge's opinion, this serves your child's best interest.
Some state courts and legal scholars believe that such an order does not place a
significant or impermissible infringement on a parent's right to make decisions on
behalf of her children. Until last year, grandparent visitation statutes allowed just
such an order.
In September 1999, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the
constitutionality of Washington's grandparent visitation statute as it applied to
Tommie Granville's rights as a mother. 2 Although the Court imposed certain
1. 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2. Troxel v. Granville, 527 U.S. 1069 (1999) (granting certiorari); see also Troxel v. Granville, 530
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procedural safeguards to protect parental rights, the Court also held, "We do not,
and need not, define today the precise scope of the parental due process right in the
visitation context," leaving a number of questions unanswered.3 Mrs. Granville
prevailed in this particular case, but for thousands of other parents the battle wages
on in state courts to determine what the Supreme Court refused to answer: Whose
kids are they, anyway?
This note seeks to flesh out the issues the Supreme Court faced in determining
when a state may legitimately abrogate a parent's right to make decisions on behalf
of his children. Part I explores the history of grandparent visitation statutes. Part
II examines Supreme Court decisions establishing parental rights. Part m discusses
the recent Supreme Court decision of Troxel v. Granville in which the Court
reviewed the constitutionality of the State of Washington grandparent visitation
statute. Part IV provides a framework for the circumstances under which a state's
interest may prevail over that of a parent, with a particular emphasis on the
appropriate level of scrutiny. Finally, Part V examines the procedural implications
of the Troxel opinion. Throughout Parts IV and V, the analysis includes discussion
regarding the most recent version of Oklahoma's grandparent visitation statute, court
opinions interpreting that statute, and the impact of Troxel on Oklahoma law.
L GrandparentVisitation Statutes
Human relationships are sensitive, extremely complex, and highly personal.
Accordingly, Americans question the propriety of legislation that attempts to
regulate such interaction. Traditionally, family matters have been an arena that
states have declined to intrude upon except in cases of harm to a family member
and cases involving issues arising from divorce.' In recent years, however, all fifty
states have passed statutes conferring upon grandparents 6 the right to petition for

U.S. 57 (2000).
3. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73.
4. Id.
5. See Sandra Joan Morris, Grandparents,Uncles, Aunts, Cousins, Friends: How Is the Court to
Decide Which Relationships Will Continue?, 12 FALL FAM. ADvoc. 10, 10 (1989) (discussing instances
in which a court may properly inject itself into familial matters); see also Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68-69
("Accordingly, so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will normally
be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further question the
ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parents children.").
6. ALA. CODE § 30-3-4 (1999); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.065 (Michie 1995); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 25-409 (West 1999); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-103 (Michie 1998); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3103 (West
1994 & Supp. 1998); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-1-117 (West 1999); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b59 (West 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1031(7) (1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 752.01 (West 2000); GA.
CODE ANN. § 19-7-3 (Harrison 1999); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-46.3 (Michie 1999); IDAHO CODE
§ 32-719 (Michie 1996); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/607 (West 1999); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-17-5-1
(Michie 1999); IOWA CODE § 598.35 (1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-129 (1998); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 405.021 (Michie 1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:344 (West Supp. 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
19-A, § 1803 (West 1998); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-102 (1999); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 119,
§ 39D (Law. Co-op. 1999); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 722.27b (Michie 1999); MINN. STAT. § 257.022
(1999); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 93-16-1, 93-16-3 (1999); Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.402 (1999); MONT. CODE
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visitation with their grandchildren! According to many of these statutes, courts
must employ the "best interests of the child" test to determine whether visitation
will be granted." These laws mark a significant departure from common law
tradition. At common law, grandparents had no rights respecting their
grandchildren
Grandparent visitation statutes were conceived in response to changes in family
dynamics and a redefinition of the term "nuclear family."'0 The increased mobility
of families, the frequent splintering of the extended family, the drastic increase of
divorces, the increase of single parent homes, and the increase in the number of
grandparents taking a more active parental role with children provide examples of
the justifications given for the recognition of grandparents' rights."
Only in recent years have grandparent visitation statutes faced constitutional
challenges. Grandparents' rights advocates maintain that grandparent-grandchild
relationships benefit the child in unique ways, such that alienation of grandparents
from their grandchildren results in disruption of the child's best interests. For
example, grandparents provide children with intergenerational contact, emotional
stability in times of family turmoil, and strong familial bonds.12

ANN. § 40-9-102 (1999); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1801 to 1803 (Michie 1999); NEV.REV. STAT.
ANN. § 125C.050 (Michie 1999); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 458:17-d (1999); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1
(West 1999); ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-9-2 (Michie 1999); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 72,240 (McKinney
1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-13.2(b)(1), .2A, .50) (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (1999); OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3109.051, 3109.11, 3109.12 (Anderson 1999); 10 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 5 (West
2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.121 (1998); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5311-5314 (West 1999); R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 15-5-24.1, .3 (1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-420(33) (Law. Co-op. 1999); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 25-4-52 (Michie 1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-302 (1999); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.433
(Vernon 1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5-2 (1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1011-1016 (1999); VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-124.1 (Michie 1999); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.240 (West 1986); W. VA. CODE
§§ 48-2B-1 to 48-2B-9 (1999); Wis. STAT. § 767.245 (1998); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 20-7-101 (Michie
1999).
7. Grandparents are not the only recipients of these rights. In some states, stepparents, siblings,
and other third parties are also allowed to petition the court for visitation. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 31023103 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998) (giving legal standing to stepparents and siblings to petition the court
for visitation); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-59 (West 1995) (allowing "any person" to petition the
court for visitation); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/607-b (West 1999) (allowing stepparents, siblings,
and great-grandparents to petition for visitation); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125C.050 (Michie 1999)
(allowing persons with whom a child has lived for more than two years to petition); 10 OKLA. STAT.
ANN. § 5 (West 2001) (adding great-grandparent to the definition of grandparent).
8. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (1999); 10 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 5 (West 1987 & Supp. 2000)
(requiring courts to apply the best interest of the child standard in determining the appropriateness of
grandparent visitation).
9. Grandparents' Rights: Preserving Generational Bonds, 1991: Hearing Before the House
Subcomm on Aging, 102d Cong. 22 (1991).
10. Id. at 2 ("Today, the role of the grandparents has taken on a new importance as we struggle to
deal with the problem of single parent families, of addition, or of employment.).
11. ld.
at 3.
12. Ross A. Thompson et al., Grandparents' Visitation Rights: Legalizing the Ties That Bind, 44
AM. PsYCHOLOGIST 1217, 1221 (1989).
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Those supporting parental rights assert that these laws impermissibly abridge a

parent's constitutionally protected right to the care and upbringing of his children.
Further arguments assert that such legislation unnecessarily interferes with parental

autonomy, changes the dynamics of a parent's role in her children's lives, arid
undermines a parent's authority to decide who associates with her children.
Parental rights have been expressed as a liberty interest secured by the Fourteenth
Amendment 3 and largely as a fundamental privacy right.' While there can be no
doubt that parents do have a right to raise their children as they see fit, the extent
to which parents may exercise that right may be limited by the state. Pursuant to
a state's police and parens patriae powers," a state may act in the interest of a
child's welfare and health. Traditionally, however, states have invoked these powers
against a parent's wishes only upon a showing of harm or threat of harm to a
child.'6

The constitutionality of grandparent visitation statutes has become a hotly debated
issue. 1 Perhaps in response to this surge of controversy, the U.S. Supreme Court

13. The Fourteenth Amendment provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
14. According to Justice Douglas, privacy rights are secured by the Constitution as follows:
Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the
penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its
prohibition against the quartering of soldiers "in any house" in time of peace without the
consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly
affirms the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures." The Fifth Amendment in its SelfIncrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government
may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: "The
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people."
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
15. "Parens patriae" literally means "parent of the country" and refers traditionally to the role of a
state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability, such as juveniles or the insane, and in
child custody determinations, when acting on behalf of the state to protect the interests of the child).
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990)
16. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 (1982); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168
(1944).
17. For instance, variolis organizations filed amicus curiae briefs with the Court regarding the Troxel
case. Those filing in favor of the respondent parents included the Christian Legal Society, the Civil
Liberties Union, the ACLU, the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, and Gay and Lesbian
Advocates. See Brief Amici Curiae of Christian Legal Society and the National Association of
Evangelicals in Support of Respondent, Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (No. 99-138); Brief
Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU Washington in Support of
Respondent, Troxel (No. 99-138); Brief of Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund and Gay and
Lesbian Advocates and Defenders as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Troxel (No. 99-138).
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struck down Washington's grandparent visitation statute as an unconstitutional
infringement on Tommie Granville's parental rights.'
11. United States Supreme Court Decisions: Examining
the Scope of ParentalRights
The history and culture of Western Civilizationreflect a strong tradition
of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children.
This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is
9
now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition.
Dating as far back as 1923, the Supreme Court has recognized parents' fundamental right to raise their children in a manner they deem appropriate, without undue
governmental intrusion.' Although parental rights are constitutionally protected,
such rights are not absolute 2 ' Therefore, in determining the constitutionality of
grandparent visitation statutes, courts must balance the parent's constitutionally
protected interest and the state's justification for any intrusion upon that interest. An
examination of Supreme Court cases dealing with the scope of parents' authority
over their children reveals three basic categories of issues decided by the Court: (1)
the extent to which parents may exercise decision-making authority over their

Organizations supporting the grandparents included the AARP and the Grandparent Caregiver Law Center
of the Brookdale Center on Aging. See Brief Amici Curiae of AARP and Generations United in Support
of Petitioners, Troxel (No. 99-138); Brief for the Grandparent Caregiver Law Center of the Brookdale
Center on Aging as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Troxel (No. 99-138). Moreover,
organizations such as the National Association of Counsel for Children and Grandparents United for
Children's Rights filed amicus briefs asserting the children's constitutional rights. See Brief in the Interest
of Amicus Curiae National Association of Counsel for Children in Support of Respondent at 13, Troxel
(No. 99-138) (urging the Court to "affirm a child's fundamental liberty interest in a relationship with his
or her parent); Brief of Amicus Curiae of Grandparents United for Children's Rights, Inc. at 3, Troel
(No. 99-138) (urging the Court's "recognition of the children's rights to liberty and equal protection in
maintaining relationships with their grandparents."),
Law reviews have also addressed this topic. See Joan Bohl. GrandparentVisitation Law Grows Up:
The Trend Toward Awarding Visitation Only When the Child Would Otherwise Suffer Harm, 48 DRAKE
L. REV. 279 (2000) (surveying various state statutes requiring a showing of harm to a child before
visitation may properly be granted to a third party); Christine Davik-Gabraith, "Grandma, Grandpa,
Where Are You?" - Putting the Focus of Grandparent Visitation Statutes on the Best Interest of the
Child, 3 ELD LJ. 143 (1995) (supporting the right of both the grandparents and grandchildren to
maintain their relationship); Morris, supra note 5 (discussing the appropriateness of third party visitation
statutes).
18. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
19. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972).
20. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
21. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (recognizing a parent's constitutional authority
but denying a natural father rights of visitation to a child born to a married woman while living with her
husband); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 632 (1968) (upholding a state statute restricting the
availability of sex material to minors); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (finding that
a state may impose regulations on child labor due to the potentially harmful effects on children,
notwithstanding a mother's objections); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 12 (1905) (upholding
a state law mandating parents to submit their children to vaccinations).
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children free from state interference; (2) the extent to which a state may interfere
with parents' rights to the custody of their children; and (3) whether a state may
override parental authority by providing a minor with access to an abortion absent
parental consent.
A. ParentsAsserting Decision-MakingAuthority over Their Children,As Against
the State
In Meyer v. Nebraska,' the Court struck down a state statute forbidding schools
to teach foreign languages to children having an eighth-grade education or lower.'
The Court found that the State did have an interest in the education of its citizens.'
However, the Court further found that forbidding the teaching of a foreign language
bore "no reasonable relation to any end within the competency of the state" to
further that state interest." Further, the Court held that absent a clear showing of
harm to the child, the statute unreasonably infringed upon a parent's right to
determine the scope of her child's education.' The Court noted that an individual's
liberty interest, guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, includes "the right...
[to] marry, establish a home and bring up children." 7 Similarly, in Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, the Court struck down a state statute imposing compulsory
public education for children." Applying the same reasoning as in Meyer, the
Court held that the Constitution affords parents the right to decide whether their
children will receive a public or private education. '
In the case of Wisconsin v. Yoder,3 the Court examined whether the State could
properly compel Amish parents to continue their child's education past the eighth
grade." The Court noted that a state may exercise its parens patriae power upon a
showing that its interest is of a magnitude sufficient to overcome parents'
constitutionally protected interests in the upbringing of their child.33 The Court held
that state action bears a "reasonable relation" to a state's interest in education where
a state can demonstrate that "parental decisions [in that arena] will jeopardize the
health or safety of the child, or have a potential for significant social burdens."'
Finding no harm, the Court once again held that the statute "unreasonably infringed"
upon parents' rights to make decisions on behalf of their children and bore no
"reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State."'

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

262 U.S. 390 (1923).
Id. at 403.
Id.
AId
Id.
Id. at 399.
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
Id. at 534-35.
Id. at 535.
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
Id. at 207.
Id. at 214.
Id. at 233-34.
Id. at 233.
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Accordingly, the Court has consistently held:
It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child
reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include
preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder. And
it is in recognition of this that these decisions have respected the private
realm of family life, which the state cannot enter. 6
In spite of the above decisions, states have successfully limited parental decisionmaking rights under certain circumstances. In these cases, the Court has balanced
the parent's right against the state's interest in protecting the child's welfare.
Notwithstanding the recognition of parental rights, the Court has observed that upon
a demonstrated harm or threat of harm to the child, the state may intervene to act
37
in the best interests of the child. For instance, in Prince v. Massachusetts,
the
Court examined the constitutionality of a state statute forbidding parents to permit
their children to sell literature in public areas.3 The Court held that a state may
contravene parents' authority over their children upon a demonstration that the
exercise of such authority would prove harmful to the child.39 The Court reasoned
that "[a]mong the evils most appropriate for [state intervention] are the crippling
effects of child employment .... and the possible harms arising from other activities
subject to all the diverse influences of the street."' Similarly, the Court has upheld
state action, over parental objection, requiring mandatory vaccinations for
children.4t There, the Court held that a state may act, pursuant to its police powers,
to ensure the health and safety of its citizens."
B. State Action Terminating Parents'Rights to Custody of Their Children
When a child's health and safety are in jeopardy, a state may properly act to
preserve and promote a child's welfare. 3 Thus, in the case of parental unfitness,
a state may act on behalf of an abused or neglected child by terminating a parent's
right to custody 4 However, because the termination of parental rights results in
permanent revocation of a fundamental liberty interest held by the parent, the Court
has required a state to prove parental unfitness by "clear and convincing
evidence."45'
36. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (citation omitted); accord Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); Quillion v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645, 650 (1972). But see Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 (1989) (plurality of the
Court finding an adulterous father had no fundamental right to visitation with his child). See generally
M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 103 (1996); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257-58 (1983); Moore v.
E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977).
37. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).

38. Id. at 160.
39. Id. at 168.
40. Id.
41. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 12 (1944).

42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 25.
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 746 (1982).
Id.
Id. at 769. See generally BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 251 (6th ed. 1990) (stating clear and
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In Stanley v. Illinois,4 the Court addressed the issue of whether mothers and
fathers are similarly situated with regard to child rearing such that both parents,
independent of one another, are afforded the same rights with respect to their
children.' The Court struck down an Illinois statutory scheme that declared
children of unmarried fathers to be wards of the state upon the death of the

children's mother." The father in Stanley was not married to the mother.49
However, prior to the mother's death, the parents lived together with their children
for eighteen years.' Balancing the interests of the parent and the State, the Court

reasoned that "[t]he private interest here, that of a man in the children he has sired
and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing
interest, protection."' Once again, the Court held that without proof of neglect, the
State's interest fails to rise to a level powerful enough to warrant intrusion into a

parent's fundamental right to the care and custody of her children.'
C. Weighing the Rights of a Minor to Seek an Abortion Against the Right of a
Parentto Assert Control over That Minor
In Roe v. Wade,3 the Court held that an individual's fundamental right to privacy
m
includes the abortion decision.
' Where fundamental rights are implicated, "[T]he
Court has held that regulations limiting these rights may be justified only by a
.compelling state interest'5" and that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn
to express only the legitimate state interests at stake." ' In a series of cases

following the Roe decision, the Court reviewed the extent to which a parent may
exercise control over his child's decision to have an abortion.' In the most recent

convincing proof will be shown where the truth of the facts asserted is highly probable).
46. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 646.
50. ld.
51. Id. at 651.
52. Id. at 658; see also Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,394 (1979) (striking down a New York
statute requiring only the consent of the mother in an adoption proceedings where the father manifested
a significant parental interest in the child). But see Quillion v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978)
(upholding a Georgia statute requiring only the consent of the mother in an adoption proceeding of a
child born out of wedlock and unlegitimized by the father and finding that the state had a more
substantial countervailing interest when a father had never exercised actual or legal custody over his
child).
53. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
54. Ld.
at 116.
55. Id. at 155. (citing Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963)).
56. Id. (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378
U.S. 500, 508 (1964); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S 296, 307-08 (1940)).
57. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416,441 (1983) (holding a state
statute requiring parental consent of a minor child seeking an abortion significantly limited the minores
access to an abortion, absent ajudicial bypass provision, and was therefore unconstitutional); Bellotti v.
Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 651 (1979) (striking down a state statutory scheme requiring parental consent for
a minor child to obtain an abortion as unconstitutionally burdensome on the right of the pregnant minor).
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of these decisions, the Court upheld a state statute requiring a minor seeking an
abortion to obtain parental consent or a judicial bypass." In past opinions
pertaining to a minor's decision to have an abortion, the Court has recognized the
"importance of the guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their children." 9
The Court found, however, that adolescents face a unique and potentially severe
detriment if forced to have a child.' Therefore, the Court concluded that if a
statute required parental consent, the statute must also provide the option of
petitioning the Court for a judicial bypass. 6'
11!. Troxel v. Granville: Parents Versus the State and Third Parties
The issue facing the Troxel Court stood in marked contrast to those considered
in the above opinions. Rather than reviewing a statute that reserved the state's
power to challenge parents' discretion regarding their child's upbringing, the Court
determined the constitutionality of a state statute that entitled private parties to
challenge parents' rights to make decisions for their children.
A. ProceduralBackground of Troxel
The Washington statute conferred upon any third party reasonable rights of
visitation with any child.' Title 26, chapter 10.160(3), in pertinent part, provided
that "[a]ny person may petition the court for visitation rights at any time... [t]he
court may order visitation rights for any person when visitation may serve the best
interest of the child."' 3
The parents in Troxel, Tommie Granville and Brad Troxel, were never married.
However, they lived together with their children for some time. During a separation,
Brad Troxel passed away. Subsequently, Granville sought to limit the amount of
time the paternal grandparents spent with the children. As a result, the Troxels
petitioned for court-ordered visitation pursuant to the above statute. The trial court
awarded them significantly more time with the children than Granville was willing
to grant them. Granville appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of
Washington.
After carefully reviewing U.S. Supreme Court precedent dealing with parental
rights, the Washington Supreme Court concluded that where an individual's
fundamental right is implicated and sought to be limited by the state, the statute

58. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992). Judicial bypass is a procedure that

allows a minor to obtain an abortion through judicial rather than parental consent. See generally Ohio
v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 508 (1990).
59. Belloni, 443 U.S. at 633.

60. Id.at 642-43.
61. See id. at 643; see also Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
62. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.09.240 (West 1999); see also id. § 26.10.160.
63. Id. § 10.160(3).
64. In re Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 27-29 (Wash. 1998) (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters. 268 U.S. 510
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)).
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must be strictly scrutinized.' The court reasoned, "It is clear from Supreme Court
precedent that some harm threatens the child's welfare before the state may
constitutionally interfere with a parent's right to rear his or her child."' The court
struck down the statute, holding that the "best interest of the child" standard did not
serve as a compelling state interest where a child's family environment is "otherwise
'
satisfactory."67
B. The Decision
In an exceptionally divided opinion," a plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court
affirmed the Washington court's holding primarily because, in the Court's opinion,
the statue was "breathtakingly broad."' Contrary to the long line of Supreme Court
decisions establishing a parent's constitutionally protected rights, the statute fatally
"contain[ed] no requirement that a court accord the parent's decision any
presumption of validity or any weight whatsoever."7 Absent a presumption in
favor of the parent's decision, trial court judges are given an impermissibly large
amount of discretion, limited only by the statute's requirement that the best interests
of the child be served. 7 The Court also viewed the statute as granting courts
impermissible discretion, because it failed to set forth factors to be considered by
trial court judges in determining whether a child's best interests would in fact be
served by granting such visitation.' Moreover, the statute provided no limitations
as to who may petition the court and under what circumstances.'
Accordingly, so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her
children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to
inject itself into the private realm of the family to further question the
ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing
of that parent's children.74
In striking down the statute, the Court placed particular emphasis on the fact that
the mother never sought complete severance of the grandparent-child relationship,
but sought only to limit the amount of visitation.7 Declining to render third-party

65. Id. at 30.
66. Ud at 29.

67. Id. at 30.
68. Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer,
delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice Thomas and Justice Souter, joining in the judgment, each
wrote separate concurrences. In addition, Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Stevens each wrote
separate dissents.
69. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67 (2000).
70. 1d.

71. Id.
72. Id. at 68.
73. Id. at 67.
74. Id. at 68-69.
75. Id.at 71.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol54/iss2/7
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visitation statutes unconstitutional per se, the Court found the Washington statute
unconstitutional as applied.76
Despite the Court's considerable emphasis on the existence of parental rights and
the cases establishing them, the Court left several questions regarding these rights
unanswered. First, the Court declined to address whether third-party visitation
statutes require a showing of harm or potential harm to the child before visitation
may properly be ordered.' Second, the Court failed to indicate the level of proof
necessary to overcome a presumption in favor of the parent's decision. Finally, the
plurality made no mention as to the appropriate level of scrutiny for determining the
constitutionality of state statutes that hinder the exercise of parental rights.?8
IV. The ConstitutionalAnalysis of GrandparentVisitation Statutes
A. What Should Be the Standard of Review?
The opinions of the plurality, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Souter
recognize [thatparents have a fundamental constitutionalright to rear
their children, including the right to determine who shall educate and
socialize them], but curiously none of them articulatesthe appropriate
standardlevel of review.'
The threshold constitutional inquiry of any grandparent visitation statute must
begin with the level of scrutiny under which the statute is to be reviewed. In his
concurrence, Justice Thomas urged that where fundamental rights are implicated,
strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard.' However, where family relationships
and fundamental rights are concerned, the Court has failed to adopt a consistent
standard. As a review, in cases where parents have asserted decision-making
authority over their children, as against a state, the Court has held that state action
may not "unreasonably infringe" on a parent's fundamental right." Moreover, a
state's interest must bear some "reasonable relationship" to the means chosen to
further that interest.' In these cases, the Court has concluded that only upon a
showing of harm will state action prevail over parents' rights to raise their children
in the manner they deem fit 3 Here, the Court seems to have applied a "rational
basis plus" standard of review. In other words, the statute must bear "a reasonable
relationship to the attainment of some legitimate governmental objective,"" and
there must be some showing of harm to the child.

76. 1l at 73.

77. let
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

ld.
Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).

id.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.A.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1262 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "rational basis").
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In other cases involving fundamental rights, the Court dispensed with the rational
basis test, thereby heightening the level of scrutiny. For example, in Zablocki v.
Redhail,'5 the fundamental right at stake was the right to marry.' The Zablocki
Court concluded that "[w]hen a statutory classification significantly interferes with
the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it is supported by
sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those
interests.""7 The standard articulated in Zablocki suggests the application of an
"intermediate" level of scrutiny."
Finally, where other fundamental rights are implicated, the Court has applied
M
Strict scrutiny
strict scrutiny to determine the constitutionality of the statutes."
requires a state to demonstrate that its interference "is (1) in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering
that [compelling governmental] interest.""
Throughout the years, the Supreme Court has seemingly applied separate,
competing standards of review to fundamental-rights analyses. However, Justice
O'Connor's dissenting opinion in City of Akron v. Akron Centerfor Reproductive
Health, Inc.,9 may help to resolve these competing standards. Justice O'Connor
concluded that where fundamental rights are involved, strict scrutiny analysis is not
automatically triggered.' Instead, a threshold examination of the extent to which
the state seeks to deprive an individual of her rights must be made. 3 Justice
O'Connor wrote:
[N]ot every regulation that the State imposes must be measured against
the State's compelling interests and examined with strict scrutiny....
The requirement that state interference "infringe substantially" or
"heavily burden" a right before heightened scrutiny is applied is not
novel in our fundamental-rights jurisprudence ....[W]e apply "strict
judicial scrutiny" only when legislation may be said to have "deprived,"
"infringed," or "interfered" with the free exercise of some such
fundamental personal right or liberty. If the impact of the regulation

85. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
86. 1&

at 388.
87. Id.
88. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 196 (1976) (requiring that state action "serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those goals").
89. Carey v. Population Sers. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 688 (1977) (holding strict scrutiny is the

appropriate level of review for a statute seeking to limit an individual's access to contraceptives); Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973) (holding regulations seeking to limit an individual's fundamental
rights are constitutionally permissible only when the state's interest is compelling and narrowly tailored);

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (holding an individual has a fundamental right to
decide whether to bear a child and therefore any state action seeking to limit that right "may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms").
90. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 515-16 (1997).
91. 462 U.S. 416 (1983), overruled by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
92. Id at 462 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
93. Id.
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does not rise to the level appropriate for our strict scrutiny, then our
inquiry is limited to whether the state law bears some "rational
relationship to legitimate state purposes.""
Justice O'Connor's dissent in Akron became a plurality opinion in Planned
Parenthoodv. Casey."
At least one state court has applied Justice O'Connor's test to conclude that
grandparent visitation statutes are not a significant infringement on parental rights,
and thus do not have to be analyzed under a strict scrutiny standard.' The
argument asserts that unlike custodial termination cases, the parents still retain
physical and legal custody of the child when grandparents obtain visitation;
therefore, the parents still make basic decisions with regard to their child's
upbringing.' By the very nature of the proceedings, termination cases are
concededly more invasive to parental rights than grandparent visitation cases
However, that is not to say that grandparent.visitation statutes do not also impose
a substantial infringement on the freedom of parents to exercise their rights as
parents. While an initial inquiry may be made to determine the extent to which
grandparent visitation statutes actually interfere with a parent's decision-making
rights as suggested by Justice O'Connor, these statutes should ultimately be strictly
scrutinized.
The Supreme Court has recognized varying circumstances under which state
infringement has been found to be significant. For example, a state's imposition of
certain regulations on a child's education is clearly not as considerable an intrusion
into parental autonomy as terminating custody. Nevertheless, the Court still held
that these regulations unreasonably infringe on a parent's fundamental rights." The
same should be true in the grandparent visitation context. Parental decision making
is critical to the parenting prcess." To ignore this reality is to trivialize the very
nature of the role parents play in their children's lives. Decisions regarding with
whom a child associates go to the very essence of parental control. Further, the U.S.
Supreme Court has consistently held that "[c]hoices about marriage, family life, and
the upbringing of children are among associational rights [the] Court has ranked as
of basic importance in our society"'01 and when the interests of1 2 third parties
conflict with familial rights, the former must give way to the latter.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
initiates

Id. at 461-62.
505 U.S. 833, 837 (1992).
Herndon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203, 208 (Mo. 1993).
Id. at 209.
See supra Part IL.B; see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759 (1982) ("When a state
a parental rights termination proceeding, it seeks not merely to infringe [on a parent's]

fundamental liberty interest, but to end it.").
99. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
100. See Cheryl Stockman Gan, Note and Comment, Grandparental Visitation Rights in Oklahoma,

26 TULSA LJ. 245, 266 (1990).
101. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116 (1996) (citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376
(1971)).
102. Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 846-47 (1977) (holding foster parents are not
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Therefore, it does not logically follow to hold that limiting a parent's role and
right as decision maker is not a significant infringement on parental authority.
Divesting a parent of a right that is crucial to effective parenting and vesting it in
the court is nothing less than a "deprivation," "infringement," or "interference" into
a realm of family matters that has been and should continue to be reserved for the
parent."° Accordingly, courts should review grandparent visitation statutes under
a strict scrutiny analysis to determine the constitutionality of these regulations.
Significantly, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma is in alignment with this position
and applies a strict scrutiny standard of review. As that court acknowledged:
It is important to recognize that mandating the introduction of a third
party, even a grandparent, into a family unit is state action limiting the
parents' liberty. Because it is "long recognized that freedom of personal
choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment[,]"
as well as Oklahoma's own constitution, the state's interest must be
sufficiently compelling to warrant such a limitation and infringement.'0
In analyzing grandparent visitation statutes, state courts have struggled with the
type of evidence that must be proffered before a court may constitutionally override
a parent's decision to discontinue visitation. Some courts have held that harm to the
child must be shown before visitation may properly be granted." Others have
only required evidence that the child's best interest would be served by granting
visitation.'" In Troxel, the primary question of constitutional import was "whether
the Due Process clause requires all non-parental visitation statutes to include a
showing of harm or potential harm to the child as a condition precedent to granting

entitled to a hearing prior to the child being returned to the parent).
103. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 462 (1983) (O'Connor,
J.,dissenting).
104. In re Herbst, 1998 OK 100, 1 10, 971 P.2d 395, 397-98 (alteration in original) (quoting
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639 (1974)).
105. Von Eiffv. Azicri, 720 So. 2d 510,516 (Fla. 1998) (affirming the "harm to the child" standard
and explaining that the "best interest of the child" standard "permits the State to substitute its own views
regarding how a child should be raised" for those the Constitution reserves for the parents); Beagle v.
Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271, 1276-77 (Fla. 1996) (concluding that the "best interests of the child" test is an
inadequate standard to apply to a statute that restricts a parent's right to raise her child without
governmental interference; without a requisite showing of harm to the child, there is no compelling state
interest); Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769 (Ga. 1995) (holding that state interference is justified only
where parental decisions pertaining to a child's health and welfare would result in harm to the child);
Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 578 (Tenn. 1993) (holding that to override a married couple's united
opposition to visitation, the state must show a "substantial danger of harm to the child").
106. Graville v. Dodge, 985 P.2d 604,610 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding a state statute requiring
the application of the best interests of the child standard to determine whether grandparent visitation is
appropriate); King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Ky. 1992) (same); Hemdon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d
203, 210 (Mo. 1993) (same).
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visitation."" Remarkably, the Court declined to address this question."m Thus,
state courts are left to decide whether a court may constitutionally compel a parent
to submit to visitation based merely on an inquiry into the child's best interest, or
if harm to the child is the more advisable standard.
Despite the Court's application of varying levels of scrutiny to fundamental-rights
analyses over the years, the Court has set forth one "bright line" test to determine
the constitutionality of state statutes that implicate parental rights. Since 1923, the
Court has consistently held that test to be harm to the child."' Yet, the Troxel
Court declined to address, much less affirm, this precedent and many state statutes
merely require that a child's best interest be served in awarding a grandparent
visitation."' However, applying the vague phrase "best interest of the child" would
fatally flaw this constitutional analysis. Further, this standard would encourage
arbitrary application of the law and "the State may no longer rely on a 'bright line'
that separates permissible from impermissible regulation."".
B. "Best Interest of the Child" Standard FrustratesParents' ConstitutionalRights
to Raise Their Children
"Best interest of the child" is an ambiguous phrase at best. The phrase begs
questions that have different answers for different people. Some people believe that
spanking a child in order to teach her respect and obedience is in the child's best
interest. Others believe that spanking is abusive and unnecessary. Some believe that
parents should guard children from the harsh realities of life until children are
mature enough to understand them; others believe that parents must bring up
children with a realistic perspective of the world. Clearly, what or who serves a
child's best interest is a subjective decision that will vary from person to person.
Who is qualified to make that judgement? Traditionally and legally, the right to
make such determinations is reserved for parents. Moreover, if a constitutional
analysis of parental rights requires merely that a child's best interest be served, then
to grant visitation only to grandparents seems to draw an arbitrary line. Surely a
child's relationship with a teacher, aunt, or uncle may also be in the best interest of
the child."' This type of result, however, is precisely the reason the Court struck
down the Washington statute. According to the Court, the language of the statute
"effectively permitt[ed] any third party seekitig visitation to subject any decision by

107. Troxel v. Granville, 520 U.S. 57, 73 (2000).
108. l
109. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 746 (1982); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233-34 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (944);
Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923).
110. See ALA. CODE § 30-3-4 (1999); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-409 (West 1999); COLO. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 19-1-117 (West 1999); Ky. R v. STAT. ANN. § 405.021 (Michie 1998); MD. CODE ANN.,
FAM. LAw § 9-102 (1999); 10 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 5 (West 2001); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 53115314 (West 1999); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.433 (Vernon 1999).
I11. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 455 (1983) (OConnor,
J., dissenting).
112. See generally Morris, supra note 5.
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a parent concerning visitation of the parent's children to state-court review," leaving
the "best interest determination solely in the hands of the judge.""'
The visitation rights conferred upon grandparents are purely statutory in nature;
so, absent a powerful state interest, they are not comparable to a parent's
constitutional right. A state's interest in preserving the best interests of the child or
ensuring that a child has access to beneficial relationships is simply not strong
enough to invade parental autonomy. Obviously, several factors determine the
grandparent's role in a child's life such as the grandparent-parent relationship, the
geographical proximity of the grandparent to the child, and the grandparentgrandchild relationship. These determinations will drastically vary from family to
family. Thus, placing total discretion in the court by using the vague "best interest
of the child" standard can lead to a tremendous amount of variance depending upon
the judge and inevitably leads to impermissible intrusions on parental rights.
The Court has consistently held that a state may not interfere in parental decision
making, absent clear evidence that such disallowance would result in harm to the
child." 4 Examples of evident "harm" include a parent refusing to take a sick child
to the hospital, a parent refusing to get a child vaccinated," 5 and instances of
abuse and neglect."' In contrast, a parent refusing to allow a child to continue a
relationship does not result in evident harm. Some argue, to the contrary, that
divesting parents of their right to determine what is in the best interest of their child
can actually be harmful to the child. At a 1991 hearing before the Subcommittee
on Human Services, a chairman for the American Bar Association pointed out:
Like many other types of family law cases, grandparent's visitation
disputes tend to be painful and disruptive for all involved, including the
children, their parents and their grandparents. These intrafamily
conflicts in themselves are emotionally wrenching; litigating them may
intensify the emotions and create conflict for the children at issue in the
dispute."7
Because of the inherent ambiguity of the phrase "best interest of the child," the
bright-line rule of harm to the child, advanced by the Supreme Court, is blurred.
Employing a "best interest of the child" analysis to determine with whom children
should establish or maintain relationships permits judges to impermissibly impose
their own views of family values upon perfectly fit parents. The Washington
Supreme Court held:
"[T]he requirement of harm standard is the sole protection that parents
have against pervasive state interference in the parenting process." For

113. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67.
114. See supra Part II; cf. supra note 105 (giving examples of state court decisions).
115. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 12 (1905).
116. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
117. Grandparents Rights: Preserving GenerationalBonds, 1991: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Aging of the House of Representatives, 102d Cong. 22 (1991) (statement made in a report submitted
by the ABA recommending the adoption of a uniform grandparent statute).
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the state to delegate to the parents the authority to raise the child as the
parents see fit, except when the state thinks another choice would be
better, is to give parents no authority at all."'
Further, by recognizing that parents have a fundamental right to determine the
proper means to raise their children, the Supreme Court has placed a certain amount
of trust in a parent's ability to make decisions in the child's best interest. This is
clearly evidenced by the Troxel Court's determination that fit parents' decisions are
presumed to be in the child's best interest."' Therefore, it is illogical to allow a
court to abrogate that right in favor of nonparents by applying a "best interest of the
child" standard.
Grandparent visitation statutes attempt to legislate family values, an arena in
which the government should tread carefully. The constitutional rights of parents
far outweigh a grandparent's desire to "keep it in the family" or a court's opinion
that such a relationship benefits the children. Certainly, a child might establish
many beneficial relationships. However, unless the child faces risk of harm, courts
should not have the authority to determine with whom a child establishes those
relationships. Notably, Oklahoma courts seem, at least to some extent, to agree with
this proposition. According to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, "[A]bsent a
showing of harm, it is not for the state to choose which associations a family must
maintain and which the family is permitted to abandon."" -This same court,
however, qualified this standard as follows: "To reach the issue of a child's best
interests, there must be a requisite showing of harm, or threat of harm, to bring the
issue before the court or some instance of death or divorce which brings the child's
domestic situation within the province of the court.''.
C. Broken Versus Intact Families: Is There a Meaningful Distinction in Terms of
ParentalAbility and Rights?
Some state courts agree that to bring the issue of the child's best interest into the
province of the court, a party must make a threshold showing of harm to the child
or a demonstration of parental unfitness." In determining the constitutionality of
a state's grandparent visitation statute, state courts have zealously supported the
constitutional rights of the parents, viewing the parent-child relationship as
paramount over the grandparent-grandchild relationship."z However, some courts

118. In re Smith, 969 P.2d 21,29-30 (Wash. 1998) (citation omitted) (quoting Hawk v. Hawk, 855
S.W.2d 573, 580 (Tenn. 1993)).

119. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67.
120. In re Herbst, 1998 OK 100, 1 18, 971 P.2d 395, 399.
121. Id.
122. Von Eiff v. Azicri, 720 So. 2d 510, 514 (Fla. 1998) (citing Hawk and concluding that a state
must first establish parental unfitness or significant harm to a child before a child's best interest can be
determined by the court); Herbst, 1998 OK 100, 18, 971 P.2d at 399 (reasoning that to reach the issue
of a child's best interest, there must be a showing of harm); Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 581 (Tenn.
1993) (holding there must be a threshold demonstration of parental unfitness or harm to the child before
a court can analyze the best interest of the child).
123. Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769, 772 (Ga. 1995); Herbst, 1998 OK 100, [ 17, 971 P.2d
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have inexplicably restricted these holdings to cases involving "intact," two-parent
families. 4 Courts have concluded, whether expressly or by implication, that both
the death of a parent and the dissolution of a marriage suffice as a demonstrated
harm compelling enough for a state to intrude upon a parent's decision-making
rights." In doing so, these courts have endorsed the proposition that parents' right
to raise their children in a manner they deem fit depends on the family composition.
Thus, courts afford more deference to the decisions of parents in intact nuclear
families than to those of divorced or widowed parents. The State may properly
abrogate a married couple's united opposition to visitation only upon a showing of
harm to the child. The parental rights of those widowed or divorced, however,
somehow lose their fundamental characteristics and must yield to the lower standard
of best interest of the child. Oklahoma courts, in particular, have struggled with this
distinction. In re Herbst and its progeny illustrate this type of judicial thinking.
In Herbst, a 1998 opinion, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma reviewed the
constitutionality of the state's grandparent visitation statute.'" Recognizing that
parents have a constitutionally protected right to raise their children without state
interference, the court concluded that the statute must be examined under strict
scrutiny analysis." The court reasoned that absent a compelling state interest,
"Any conflict between the fundamental, constitutional right of parents to care for
their children as they see fit and the statutorily created right of grandparental
visitation must be reconciled in favor of the preservation of the parent's
constitutional rights. The relationship between parent and child must be held
paramount."'"
Thus, a state's compelling interest is "implicated upon a finding of harm to the
child ... or of the custodial parent's unfitness.' 29 As noted above, however, the
court further concluded that a state's interest may also rise to a level so compelling
as to justify court-ordered grandparent visitation in cases of divorce or death of a

at 399; Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 575.
124. Herbst, 1998 OK 100, 1 18, 971 P.2d at 399; Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 575.
125. Herbst, 1998 OK 100, 18, 971 P.2d at 399 (concluding that the best interests of the child
issue may be implicated upon a showing of harm to the child, or some instance of death or divorce);
Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 578 (holding that to override a married couple's united opposition to visitation the
state must show a "substantial danger of harm to the child"); Stockman Gan, supra note 100, at 272.
126. In 1998, the full text of title 10, section 5(A)(1) of the Oklahoma Statutes provided:
Pursuant to the provisions of this section, each and every grandparent of an unmarried
minor child shall have reasonable rights of visitation to the child if the district court
deems it to be in the best interest of the child. The right of visitation to any grandparent
of an unmarried minor child shall be granted only so far as that right is authorized and
provided by order of the district court.
10 OKLA. STAT. § 5(A)(1) (Supp. 1998). The current version of the statute reads a bit differently: "Ihe
grandparent of an unmarried minor child may seek and be granted reasonable visitation rights to the child
which visitation rights may be independent of either parent if the district court deems it to be in the best
interest of the child and" other factors must also be considered. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 5(A)(1) (2001).
127. Herbst, 1998 OK 100, 1 10, 971 P.2d at 397-98.
128. Id. 1 17, 971 P.2d at 399.
129. Id. 1 13, 971 P.2d at 398.
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parent.' Accordingly, the court held Oklahoma's grandparent visitation statute to
be unconstitutional only as applied to intact, fit families, where harm to the child
could not be demonstrated.' As of September 2001, a bill is pending in the
Oklahoma legislature to amend the statute to reflect the Herbst holding.'
Since the Herbst opinion, the Court of Civil Appeals has had ample opportunity
to apply the case's holding. The first case, Fink v. Corlett,' involved a remarried
grandfather who, along with his new wife, had custody of the child at issue. The
ex-wife/grandmother petitioned the court for visitation with the grandchild. Relying
on Herbst, the court found the statute to be an unconstitutional infringement of
parental rights when applied to a fit, intact nuclear family.'" Just a few months
later, Queen v. Henson'" reached a similar outcome. The court found the statute
constitutionally infirm as applied to a mother's refusal to allow her parents visitation
with her child.'36 In Queen, however, the court extended the definition of an intact
family to include the child, the child's mother, and the child's stepfather. The
stepfather in this case had not adopted the child and the biological father was
unknown. Notably, the court held that the statute, as applied in Herbst, was
unconstitutional not because it implicated the rights of parents in an intact family,
but solely because there were no allegations of harm to the child or parental
unfitness.' Moreover, the court declined to endorse the notion that the marital
status of the biological parents could be used as a vehicle to "erode a fit [parent's]
fundamental right to determine whether her parents may have a relationship with her
M
child."'
In marked contrast to the above opinions, the Court of Civil Appeals rejected
parents' constitutional challenges to the visitation statute in the cases of Sicking v.
Sicking' and Hartness v. Hartness." In Sicking, the paternal grandparents filed
a petition to intervene in the parents' divorce, seeking visitation with their
grandchild. The court awarded the grandparents visitation with the child, to be

130. Id
131. Id.

18, 971 P.2d at 399.

132. A bill pending before the Oklahoma legislature provides:
In addition to determining the best interest of the child, in granting visitation rights to
grandparents pursuant to this section over the objection of both parents, the court shall
find that: (1) the child would suffer harm or potential harm without the granting of
visitation rights to the grandparents of the child... or (3) the parents of the child are

unfit.
H.B. 1725, 48th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2001), available at http://www.lsb.state.ok.us (last visited Oct.
2001). This bill was approved by the Oklahoma State House of Representatives on February 26, 2001.

Id.
133. 1999 OK CIV APP 44, 980 P.2d 1128.
134. Id.2, 980 P.2d at 1129. The fit, intact nuclear family included the grandfather, his new wife,

and the child. Id.
135. 1999 OK CIV APP 116, 993 P.2d 129.
136. Id. 1 14, 980 P.2d at 131.
137. Id. 13, 980 P.2d at 131.
138. Id. 12, 980 P.2d at 131.
139. 2000 OK CIV APP 32, 996 P.2d 471.
140. 1999 OK CIV APP 138, 994 P.2d 1196.
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exercised in conjunction with or in place of the father's visitation should he be
unable to exercise such right. The custodial mother appealed this decision, arguing
that even where a child's parents are divorced, awarding visitation to a nonparent
is unconstitutional where a nonparent fails to show harm or a threat of harm to the
child. Rejecting this argument, the court held that "the right protected in Herbst is
a right enjoyed by both parents" and, in this case, only the mother opposed
visitation. 4' Unlike Queen, the Sicking court made much of the fact that this case
did not involve an intact nuclear family where both fit parents objected to
visitation.4 1 Citing Herbst, the Sicking court upheld the constitutionality of the
statute as applied in this case because the parents' "divorce [brought] the child's
43
domestic situation within the province of the court."'
The facts in Hartness were nearly identical to those in Sicking with one possibly
important distinction. The grandparents in Hartnesspetitioned for visitation after
the divorce was granted and after custody was determined.' " In Hartness, the
court reversed the dismissal of the grandparents' petition for visitation.'45 Once
again, the court noted that while harm to the child serves as a state interest
compelling enough to justify court intervention, cases of divorce or the death of a
parent also justify intervention." Interestingly, at least one civil court of appeals
in Oklahoma has noted the obvious tension between the Queen and Sicking/Hartness
opinions regarding whether harm to the child or parental unfitness is required before
third parties may petition the court for visitation, or if the parents' marital status
47
may properly serve as this vehicle.
Since Troxel, however, it appears that consideration of a parent's marital status
has no place in this constitutional analysis. At the time the Troxel grandparents filed
their petition, the father was deceased, leaving the mother a single parent. Perhaps
even more significant, the parents in Troxel were never married. Evidently, these
facts made absolutely no impression on the Court because the Court made no
mention of the mother's marital status when it concluded: "[I]t cannot now be
doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the
fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and

Sicking, 2000 OK CIV APP 32, '114, 996 P.2d at 474.
Id. 1 10, 996 P.2d at 474.
Id. J 12, 996 P.2d at 474.
Hartness, 1999 OK CIV APP 138. 1,994 P.2d at 1197.
Id. 4, 994 P.2d at 1198.
Id. 4,994 P.2d at 1197.
Graham v. Woffard, 2000 OK CIV APP 101, 12 P.3d 487. As Judge Buettner noted:
Decisions since Herbst are in conflict....
In Sicking v. Sicking, this court held that § 5 was constitutional where, in a divorce
action, the grandparents sought and received visitation over the objection of mother but
with the consent of father.
In Hartnessv. Hartness, grandparents filed for visitation after the parents divorced.
Mother objected while father consented. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed dismissal
of the action.
Id. 9 3 n.2., 12 P.3d at 488 n.2.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
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control of their children.' 4 ' Accordingly, all fit parents, whether married, single,
or widowed, are entitled to the same amount of constitutional protection of their
parental rights. Thus, at least in the grandparent visitation context, statutes that
distinguish between the rights of intact families and those of broken families are
unconstitutional and courts that uphold these statutes are in error. "The Constitution
protects 'the right of the individual... to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion,""'49 not merely those individuals whose family composition mirrors the
ideal family unit.
In accordance with Troxel, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma abandoned its
original position in Herbst that the state may statutorily distinguish between the
rights of married parents and those divorced or widowed." Neal v. Lee'
involved a grandmother's petition to visit her daughter's three children. The oldest
of the three, Joshua, was born out of wedlock. Joshua's parents never married and
his father subsequently passed away. Joshua's mother then remarried. Of this
marriage, Whitney and Hunter were born. A few years later, the maternal
grandmother petitioned the court for visitation of all three children. Initially, the
parents agreed to three supervised visits and a visitation plan formulated by a child
therapist. The recommended plan was to be confirmed within ten days absent an
objection by the parents. A timely objection was filed; three days later, the
stepfather filed a petition to adopt Joshua. Finally, the parents moved for
termination of the grandmother's visitation.
The district court granted the grandmother visitation with all three children in
accordance with the visitation plan. The parents appealed, challenging the
constitutionality of title 10, section 5 of the Oklahoma Statutes. Applying Troxel,
the court found that the awarded visitation violated the mother's constitutional rights
with respect to Joshua and stood as an unconstitutional infringement of both parents'
Adhering to the Herbst harm
rights with respect to Whitney and Hunter.
requirement, the court held that this standard applied equally to intact families and
single parents." Thus, the absence of one parent does not diminish the other
parent's constitutionally protected rights to rear her children."M Disregarding its
original holding in Herbst, the court noted: "The fact that in Herbst, the child was
living in an intact nuclear family was not necessary to the holding. Joshua's father's
death does not affect [the mother's] fitness as a mother nor alter her constitutionally
protected rights to rear her child without state interference." " '
Thus, according to Herbst, absent a showing of harm, there is no statutory basis
for grandparental visitation in the case of fit, married parents. Likewise, according
to Neal, the same result must be reached when a single parent, where the other

148. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000).
149. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
150. Neal v. Lee, 2000 OK 90, 14 P.3d 547.
151. Id.

152. Id. 8, 14 P.3d at 550.
153. Id. 111, 14 P.3d at 550.
154. Id.
155. Id. (citation omitted).
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parent is unknown or deceased, opposes visitation with her child. In other words,
the absence of one parent does not diminish the other's fundamental rights such that
the lower best-interest standard can be applied without violating that parent's
constitutional rights. In light of Neal, several provisions of the current version of
title 10, section 5 will have to be amended. As the statute now stands, grandparents
need only show that visitation is in the child's best interest where one parent has
deceased," one or both parents have had their parental rights terminated,-" or
the child's parents have never married and are not cohabitating"' All of these
provisions must now require a showing of harm to the child before an Oklahoma
court may constitutionally grant visitation.
The question left unanswered is whether harm to the child must be shown when
both parents are living, but divorced. According to Herbst, if the child's "domestic
situation" is before the court, as it is in divorce proceedings, grandparents may
properly petition for visitation.' A bill pending before the Oklahoma legislature
would require a showing of harm or parental unfitness if visitation is requested
"over the objection of both parents. " 1" Strict adherence to this language mandates
that courts invoke the harm standard in cases where both parents oppose visitation,
even in cases of divorce, regardless of whether the grandparent's petition is in
conjunction with the divorce proceedings.
Another questionable situation involves the case of divorced parents, both alive,
where only one opposes visitation. As these facts were neither before the Troxel
Court nor the Neal court, the status of divorced parents' rights when asserted against
each other are uncertain. According to Troxel, all parents enjoy the same amount
of constitutional protection to raise their children in a manner they deem fit. 6'
Thus, the parents' respective rights, in this situation, might cancel each other out.
The more probable result, however, is that the decision will turn on which parent
has custody of the child. For example, a parent with sole custody would be entitled
to require a showing of harm to the child before his decision to oppose visitation
can be constitutionally infringed upon. The noncustodial parent, however, would not
be entitled to the same bundle of rights with regard to his child's upbringing.
Should the noncustodial parent oppose visitation, he may be forced to submit to the
custodial parent's decision.

156. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 5(A)(1)(c) (2001).
157. id. § 5(A)(1)(h).
158. Id. § 5(A)(l)(g).
159. In re Herbst, 1998 OK 100, 1 18, 971 P.2d 395, 399.
160. H.B. 1725, 48th Leg., Ist Sess. §§ 5(D)(2)(a)(l), 5(D)(2)(a)(3) (Okla. 2001), available at
http.//www.lsb.state.ok.us (last visited Oct. 2001).
161. 530 U.S. 57,68-69 (2000) ("[S]o long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e.,
is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family
to further question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that
parentfs children.").
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D. Defining Harm in Oklahoma
Oklahoma law requires, regardless of the parent's marital status, a showing of
harm to the child or parental unfitness before third parties may properly be granted
visitation. The primary issue now facing Oklahoma courts is the precise nature of
the harm necessary to overcome a parent's decision. This will depend on the court's
definition of harm. However, "[t]he paradox is that if the harm is great enough for
State intervention, the issue should not be grandparental visitation, but custody of
the child."'"
If the bill pending in the Oklahoma legislature is enacted, Oklahoma's grandparent
visitation statute will provide: '[HIarm or potential harm' means a showing that
without court-ordered visitation by the grandparents, the child's emotional or
physical well being would be jeopardized."" This suggests that if a petitioner can
show that severing the grandparent-grandchild relationship would have harmful
effects on the child, the state may then have a compelling interest. Concededly,
grandparents can be valuable in a child's upbringing and they can help provide the
child with love, affection, and emotional stability. However, the core issue is not
what the grandparent can provide the child. On the contrary, the central concern is
whether forcing parents to allow their children to maintain these relationships
furthers a child's best interests. Forcing a parent to appear in court, seek legal
counsel, pay legal fees, and deal with the stress of litigation creates a tremendous
amount of anxiety and does not encourage a healthy family environment. Arguably,
if the parent faces such stress and turmoil, this will have a direct and harmful
impact on the child. Thus, the court must weigh the harm a child might encounter
upon severing the grandparent-grandchild relationship against the other harms
implicated when the child becomes the source of litigation.
More often than not, however, the "harm" standard contemplated by the Supreme
Court seems to suggest physical harm. Therefore, the harm a child may suffer from
ceasing to maintain a relationship with a grandparent does not seem to be the type
of harm the Supreme Court intended when setting this standard. The Court has
found harm when parents expose their children to the "crippling effects of child
employment,"'" neglect or abuse," and transmission of diseases that could
otherwise be avoided." In all of these cases, the parents caused a tangible,
physical harm or threat of a tangible, physical harm to the child.
However, in Prince v. Massachusetts, the Court listed different ways in which
harm can manifest in a child, including "emotional excitement and psychological or
physical injury."'" Accordingly, a valid argument for grandparent visitation

162. Graham v. Woffard, 2000 OK CIV APP 101, 1 6, 12 P.3d 487, 488.
163. H.B. 1725, 48th Leg., 1st Sess. § 5(D)(2)(b)(I) (Okla. 2001), available at
http:llwww.isb.state.ok.us (last visited Oct. 2001).
164. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944).
165. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,747 (1982); Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Serv.
Agency, 458 U.S. 502 (1982).
166. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1904).
167. 321 U.S. at 168.
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statutes is that a child's psychological welfare could be in danger if she is stripped
of a relationship she has come to depend upon. However, because of the limited
amount of research conducted on grandparent-grandchild relationships, there is
simply no evidence that this relationship is always beneficial to the child.'68
Despite the lack of scholarship on this subject, research has shown that a child's
relationship with his grandparents directly correlates to the nature of the relationship
between the parents and the grandparents.'" Thus, if the grandparent-parent
relationship is strained, there is a high likelihood that the grandparent-grandchild
relationship will also be strained. Obviously, if the grandparent petitions the court
to intercede, there has been a significant breakdown between the grandparent and
the parent. Thus, the potential benefits of the grandparent-grandchild relationship
are drastically limited.70 "Consequently, most of the obstacles that grandparents
may encounter in their efforts to support their grandchildren cannot effectively be
resolved by litigation that makes the child's parents and grandparents adversaries in
a courtroom.'.'
Further, granting grandparent visitation over the objection of the parent places
children in the precarious position of having to choose loyalties between the parent
and the grandparent.'" "Children are likely to encounter loyalty conflicts during
the judicial proceedings, and if a visitation petition is granted, loyalty conflicts are
likely to be maintained over time as the child remains the focus of... conflict.'""
Surely, such situations pose a great deal of emotional and psychological harm to the
child. Unless there is evidence that clearly and competently establishes that a child
will suffer irreparable harm without the companionship of the grandparents, courts
cannot grant grandparent visitation and feel confident that such visitation will
always be in the best interest of the child. To the contrary, making a child the
subject of litigation never furthers a child's best interests.
Finally, in Oklahoma, a petitioning grandparent may properly be awarded
visitation if he can show parental unfitness. According to title 10, section 5 of the
Oklahoma Statutes, parents with a history of substance abuse, domestic abuse,
violent behavior, and emotional or mental disorders, may all be deemed unfit for the
purposes of determining whether visitation may be granted." This provision is
nonsensical. Again, if this type of evidence can be provided to a court, the
grandparents' petition is hopefully for custody rather than visitation. While the
statute expressly provides that these parental behaviors do not have to rise to a level
sufficient to terminate parental rights, courts always have the option of granting
custody to the grandparents.

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Thompson et al., supra note 12, at 1221.
Ua. at 1219.
Id.
Id.

Id. at 1220.

173. Id.
174. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 5(D)(2)(b)(2)(a)-(e)
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V. The ProceduralImplications of Troxel
A. The Presumption
If a statute is able to pass constitutional muster, such that the grandparent now has
standing to petition a court for visitation, according to Troxel, the grandparent must
also overcome certain procedural obstacles before visitation may properly be granted.
In the Troxel Court's estimation, as long as a parent is fit, he i' entitled to a
presumption that his decision to disallow visitation is already in the child's best
interest."S Several conclusions can be drawn from this holding. As an initial matter,
this requirement presupposes that all parents are entitled to such a presumption.
Drawn to its logical conclusion, if the parent was not fit to adequately care for the
child, the issue would be custody rather than visitation. Second, courts are no longer
at liberty to make a determination regarding a child's best interest until the
presumption has been successfully rebutted." According to the Troxel plurality, this
dispenses with a judge's broad discretion to impose her own family values upon
perfectly fit parents." Finally, this presumption effectively places the burden of
proof on the petitioning grandparent. Despite the Court's failure to articulate the level
of proof necessary to overcome this presumption, clear and convincing seems to have
support from at least a plurality of the Court."
Significantly, perhaps, the Court cited to grandparent visitation statutes adopted by
Nebraska and Rhode Island."7 In Nebraska, petitioners must show by clear and
convincing evidence that a "significant beneficial relationship" exists between the
grandparent and child, that the best interests of the child would be served by
continuance of that relationship, and that the parent-child relationship will not be
adversely affected by such visitation."f Similarly, the Rhode Island statute requires
clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner "has successfully rebutted the
presumption that the parent's decision to refuse the grandparent visitation with the
grandchild is reasonable." 8 ' Based on cites to these statutes, Troxel may require
clear and convincing evidence of parental unfitness.
Interestingly, the most recent version of Oklahoma's grandparent visitation statute
does not reflect the Court's parental-presumption requirement." In fact, the bill
currently pending before the Oklahoma legislature also does not reflect Troxel's
parental-presumption requirement." The Oklahoma Supreme Court did, however,
acknowledge the Troxel Court's finding that the burden of proof lies with the

175. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67 (2000).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See id. at 70.
179. Id. at 70.
180. NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-1802(2) (1998).
181. R.l. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-24.3(a)(2)(v) (Supp. 1999).
182. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 5 (2001).
183. H.B. 1725,48th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2001), availableat http.//www.lsb.state.ok.us (last visited
Oct. 2001).
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petitioning grandparents." s For purposes of clarity and to ensure uniform adherence
to the Troxel presumption, the Oklahoma legislature should write this requirement into
the statute and set forth the level of proof necessary to rebut this presumption. Also,
according to Troxel, all parents are equally entitled to this presumption. Thus, the
threshold inquiry must be whether the petitioning grandparents have rebutted the
presumption, rather than whether granting visitation is in the best interests of the child.
Therefore, all provisions contained in the Oklahoma statute that require only an
inquiry into the child's best interest must be amended.
B. Evidence That Sufficiently Rebuts a Presumption in Favor of the Parent's
Decision
While the Court never addressed precisely what type of evidence sufficiently
overcomes this presumption, the Troxel opinion clearly holds that evidence of a "mere
disagreement" concerning a child's best interest is insufficient to compel visitation. "
Moreover, the Court held that "the Due Process Clause does not permit a State to
infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make child-rearing decisions simply
because a state judge believes a 'better' decision could be made."'" Additionally, the
Court held that evidence proving that a continued relationship between the grandparent
and child will benefit the child, without more, is unlikely to suffice to rebut the
parental presumption."
The type of evidence contemplated by Oklahoma courts to overcome the
presumption seems to be evidence of harm to the child or of parental unfitness.
According to the Herbst opinion, "To reach the issue of the child's best interest, there
must be a requisite showing of harm, or threat of harm, to bring the issue before the
court."' This requirement has been applied by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma
throughout the last few years."
C. How the Presumption Plays Out in Cases of Divorce
While a presumption in favor of the parents' decision now exists, applying the
presumption may prove problematic in cases where the parents are divorced.
Assuming that the parents of an intact family will agree as to the propriety of
visitation, the courts should treat the parents as a unit and presume their collective
decision to be in the child's best interest. Similarly, if one parent has passed away,
then the presumption obviously runs in favor of the widowed parent. All of these
cases assume that either the parents are in agreement as to visitation or that only one
is entitled, by law, to make that decision. However, the difficulty arises in the case
of divorced parents where only one parent opposes visitation. Which parent is entitled

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Neal v. Lee, 2000 OK 90, 1 7, 14 P.3d 547, 549.
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67 (2000).
Id at 73.
Id
In re Herbst, 1998 OK 100, 18, 971 P.2d 395, 399.
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to assert this presumption could become a point of contention. The answer may turn
on which parent has custody of the child.
Because courts have several options when arranging custody, each custodial
situation raises different concerns regarding the parental presumption in grandparent
visitation cases. First, the court may award custody to one parent, granting the
noncustodial parent visitation rights. In this case, the presumption should only extend
to those decisions made by the custodial parent. This is especially true in Oklahoma,
due to the following pronouncement of the Oklahoma Supreme Court:
It is not the business of the courts to become involved in everyday
decisions of child rearing which are properly the prerogative of the
parents or, in the case of divorced parents, the custodial parent.... In the
absence of specific provisions in the divorce decree or an agreement
between the parents, the sole decision making power over significant
decisions affecting the child's welfare.., resides in the custodial parent.
The rights and obligations of custody are extensive and operate against
third parties, including the non-custodial parent, as well as against the
state.'"
Accordingly, should a grandparent petition for court-ordered visitation rights, the court
must accord special weight to only those decisions of the custodial parent.
Other custodial options available to the court are joint legal and joint physical
custody. Joint physical custody means that each parent will receive equal amounts of
time with the child.'91 Conversely, "'[j]oint legal custody' means that both parents
have equal rights and responsibilities for major decisions concerning the child."'"
Because joint physical custody contemplates equality only as to physical contact with
the child, deciding which parent is entitled to the presumption may be a simple task.
Suppose, for example, that maternal grandparents want visitation with their
grandchildren, but dad opposes visitation. During mom's court-ordered time with the
child, the presumption runs in favor of mom's decision. If the grandparents petition
for visitation independent from that of their daughter's visitation rights, therefore
interrupting dad's time with his child, the presumption runs in his favor.
However, if joint legal custody is shared, and each parent is equally entitled to
assert decision-making authority over the child, which parent has legal standing to
oppose visitation, and thereby assert the presumption in favor of his or her decision,
may be more problematic. Oklahoma does not recognize, nor provide for by statute,
any distinction between joint legal and joint physical custody." Ideally, the divorce

190. Stephen v. Stephen, 1997 OK 53, 2, 937 P.2d 92, 98 (Simms, J., concurring) (holding that
the decision to homeschool is properly within the discretion of the custodial parent). Justice Simms'
concurrence commanded an equal number of votes as the plurality opinion.
191. Robert G. Spector, The OklahomaLaw of Child Custody and Visitation: PresentPositions and
Future Trends, 45 OKLA. L. REv. 389, 418 (1992) (citing MODEL JOINT CUSTODY ACT § 2(b) (1988),
reprintedin FAIRSHARE: THE MATRIMONIAL LAw MONTHLY, May 1988, at 7).
192. ld.
193. 43 OKLA. STAT. § 109(B) (2001) (stating "the terms joint custody and joint care, custody, and
control mean the sharing by parents in all or some of the aspects of physical and legal care, custody, and
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decree will set forth each parent's respective rights to the child. Barring such a
provision, or if the parents are not in agreement as to who will exercise decisionmaking power over the child, which parent the presumption works in favor of remains
uncertain.
D. Once the Presumption Has Successfully Been Rebutted
Assuming the parental presumption is successfully rebutted, the next procedural step
will be to determine whether visitation is in fact in the child's best interest. The Troxel
Court noted that grandparent visitation statutes should contain certain "special factors"
for the court's consideration." Although the Court did not discuss what these factors
might include, at least two possibilities can be gleaned from the opinion. First, the
Court cited two state statutes that required the grandparents to show that visitation
would not interfere with the parent-child relationship or hinder the parent's authority
over the child.' These factors, according to the Court, enforce the presumption and
protect a parent's fundamental rights." Second, evidence that visitation has been
denied altogether may also properly be considered by the court to determine the child's
best interests. Notably, the Troxel Court made much of the fact that Mrs. Granville
did not seek to sever the grandparent-grandchild relationship entirely." Rather, she
merely sought to limit the amount of visitation. Endorsing several state statutes, the
Court wrote, "Significantly, many other States expressly provide by statute that courts
may not award visitation unless a parent has denied (or unreasonably denied) visitation
to the concerned third party."'
The current version of title 10, section 5 of the Oklahoma Statutes lists several
factors for the court to consider in determining whether visitation is in a child's best
interest. For example "the willingness of the grandparent or grandparents to encourage
a close relationship between the child and the parent,"'" the length and quality of the
prior relationship between the child and the grandparent or grandparents,' and the
child's need for continuing contact with the grandparent" may be considered in
determining the child's best interest.' While the Oklahoma Supreme Court now

control of their children").
194. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000).
195. Id. at 70 (citing the Minnesota and Maine grandparent visitation statutes); see afro ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1803(3) (West 1998) (requiring evidence that visitation "would not significantly
interfere with any parent-child relationship or with the parent's rightful authority over the child"); MINN.
STAT. § 257.022(2)(a)(2) (1999) (requiring evidence that "visitation would not interfere with the parentchild relationship").
196. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 70.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 71.
199. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 5(D)(1)(a) (2001).
200. Id. § 5(D)(1)(b).
201. Id. § 5(D)(2)(g).
202. The statute also requires the court to consider the child's preference (if the court determines
he is of sufficient maturity, considering the child's mental and physical health), the grandparents' mental
and physical health, the parents' mental and physical health, the quality of the parent-child relationship,
and other factors the court deems necessary in the specific circumstances. ld § 5(D)(1)(a)-(e).
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employs the harm standard regardless of the parents' marital status, the Oklahoma
legislature has yet to draft a statute reflecting these opinions. Despite the legislature's
resistance on this point, there can no longer be any doubt that all parents, united,
divorced, or widowed, are meant to enjoy the same rights with respect to their
children. To be sure, Oklahoma's statute is much more comprehensive than
Washington's statute. To this end, once the parental presumption has been rebutted,
a court's consideration of the factors contained in file 10, section 5(D)(l)-(6) will
likely suffice as the "special factors" required by Troxel.
Conclusion
The underlying assumption that vests parents with decision-making authority over
their children is that parents "possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience and
capacity for judgment."' Relying on this premise, any law that limits a parent's role
in her child's life impliedly questions a parent's fitness. Thus, courts have always
placed the burden on the state to prove that interference into a family's life is
warranted by parental unfitness. This burden reflects the presumption that parents are
fit to make decisions on behalf of their children unless the state can prove otherwise.
An individual's right to privacy is implicated the moment the legislature begins to
require people to establish or maintain relationships with others. Once a parent's
liberty to make those decisions for his children is interfered with, no matter how
severe or minimal that interference, strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard of
review. Thus, only upon a showing of harm to a child may a state permissibly intrude
upon a parent's constitutionally protected right to raise her child in the manner she
deems appropriate. Divesting a parent of this right leaves parents and their children
at the mercy of the courts to impose a subjective "best interests of the child" standard
and rely on the court's own notions of a healthy family.
The Supreme Court's decision in Troxel raised the bar on limiting a parent's rights.
Courts must now approach all third-party visitation petitions assuming that the parent's
decision regarding visitation furthers the child's best interest. Moreover, the best
interest issue may not even be considered by a court until the presumption has been
successfully rebutted by the petitioning party.
Inherent in parental rights are parental obligations. On a large scale, these
obligations include financially supporting the child, preserving the child's health, and
hopefully raising the child to become an emotionally mature, responsible adult. On
a smaller scale, these obligations include bathing the child, feeding the child, and
reading the child bedtime stories. If courts are willing to confer upon grandparents the
right to the companionship of a child, the very same right, incidentally, that a
noncustodial parent may have, then it is not unreasonable to also expect these
grandparents to be held to the obligations of a parent. Parental rights are not free.
Parents work hard every day to ensure their children's emotional, physical, and
spiritual well being. Most parents take this job very seriously, especially when
deciding with whom their children should establish and maintain relationships. Unless

203. Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769, 772 (Ga. 1995).
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these decisions illustrate a parent's unfitness to take on the daily responsibilities of
parenthood, a state should not attempt to limit the parent's right to make them.
Natania M. Soto
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